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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of )
Catharine Armstrong,
Catharine Mayo,
)

...

LEROY MAYO, •

..

vs.

c.

HENRY K. LOGAN,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF:

)
)

Case No •
11090

)

ADDITIONAL CASES

J. L. Gibson, of attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant, requests that on Page 4 at the end of
the quote there be inserted:
In Swan vs. Hammond 138 Mass. 45, 52 AM.
Rep. 255, the court held that a will made by a
woman before marriage was revoked upon marriage
in spite of her emancipation, and in so holding
stated: "A will made before marriage, and taking
effect after marriage, must take effect in a very
different manner from that in the mind of a
testator when the will was made. The rights of
a husband or wife must greatly modify its provisions; and it can hardly be supposed that an
urunarried person would make the same will he or
she would make after marriage."
By virtue of this case the will of an unmarried woman was revoked upon marriage, but the
will of a man was not revoked until marriage and
birth of issue. Massachusetts amended its law
in 1892 by making the will of a man also revoked
upon marriage by a special statute now known as
Sec. 191-9 of the Mass. General Laws.
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See also In re Petridge Will, 47 Wash., 77,
91 Pac. 634.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent admits the statement of facts as set forth in
appellant's brief, and that the question at issue is whether a will
executed by a woman who thereafter marries is revoked as a matter of law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMON LAW THAT THE MARRIAGE OF A WOM.
AN REVOKED HER PRIOR EXISTING WILL WAS NEVER THE
LAW OF UTAH.
Article XXll, Sec. 2 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
"Real and personal estate of every female, acquired
before marriage, and a II property to which she may after·
wards become entitled by purchase, gift, grant, inheritance
or devise, shall be and remain the estate and property of
such female, and shall not be liable for the debts, obliga·
+ions or engagements of her husband, and may be conveyed,
devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried."
The constitutional provision is implemented by Sec. 30-2-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953.
The constitution and statutes of Utah have completely eliminated the common law fiction that the husband and wife are one,
and the separate identity of the husband and wife, in al I property
and personal rights, is the same as if they were not married. In
the case of Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P. 2d 696, the
court said:
"Our Husband and Wife statutes recognize in both
husband and wife every kind of right which they were de·
prived of by the common law fiction that they were one,
including the right to own, possess and manage every kind
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of real and personal property, the right to sue and be
sued for the protection of every kind of property and personal rights even as against the other. Besides the rights
granted in the statutes above quoted, our statutes provide that the wife may be and remain the owner with the
right of possession and control of all of her property whether acquired prior to or during coverture, which she may convey, devise and bequeath as if she were unmarried and that
such property shall not be liable for the debts of her husband."
See also: Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 P. 833.
Appellant cites Sec. 68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated

1953

relative to the adoption by the State of Utah of the common law
of England. Sec. 68-3-2, Utah Code Annoted 1953 provides as
follows:
"The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application
to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws
of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate,
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are
to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of
the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any
variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity
shall prevail."
In the case of Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P. 2d 94
the Court said:
"Section 68-3-1 only adopts the common law of England so far 'as it is consistent with and adapted to the
natural and physical conditions of this State and the necessities of the people thereof' and not repugnant to or
in conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United
States or this State. * * * it is clear that by this statute
we adopted the common law of England only where it is
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suitable to our conditions, morals, history and background,
that generally we look to the system of common law and
equity which prevails in and has been and is now being developed by the decisions of this country and that we reject
the common law of England which is not suitable or adapted
to our needs, morals or ideals. * * * Utah has completely
emancipated and given a married woman the same rights
as she would have had were she not married and the same
rights to her separate property as her husband, both by
our decision and statutes.***"
See also: In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757.
The single question involved in the instant case, as stated in
Appellant's Brief, is whether the marriage of a woman revokes a
will made by her while she was single. At common law, marriage
revoked a woman's will previously made, and this was so because
marriage destroyed the ambulatory character of the will, and
without that feature the paper ceased to be a will at all. The
marriage destroyed the ambulatory character of the will, because
by the marriage the wife was deprived of the power to devise her
real estate, and was prevented from bequeathing her personal
property, except by the consent of her husband given at the time
of the execution, and continued until the probate of the will. Her
incapacity to make a will after marriage prevented her from altering or revoking one made before marriage, and it was this incapacity, and nothing else, that constituted the reason upon which
the common-law rule as to revocation by marriage was founded.
This incapacity arose out of her husband's marital right to control
her property. When those rights did not exist or were excluded, as
in the execution of a power of appointment, the incapacity ceased,
and the wife could notwithstanding her coverture make a valid
wil I. It is obvious therefore that the rule does not and never did
apply to a case where the reason of the rule was absent. It is provided in the Constitution of Utah that the property acquired by

5
a married woman, both before and after marriage, by purchase,
gift, grant, inheritance or devise, shall be and remain the estate
and property of such female, and may be conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried. That constitutional
provision removed every common-law disability to which a married woman was formerly subjected with respect to making a valid
will. She was placed by it, so far as her capacity to make a will
is concerned, upon exactly the same footing as

an

unmarried

woman. She can revoke a will already made, and she may by will
dispose of her property against the wishes of her husband, and
even to his entire exclusion except for his statutory claim of homestead. The constitution of this state clothes her, with full and absolute testamentary power over her own property, no matter how
that property was acquired, and gives to her husband no authority
to restrict her exercise of it. If under these circumstances her marriage operates to revoke her will made before marriage, the revocation would be idle and utterly fruitless, because the moment
afterwards she could confessedly make a new and valid will in
identically the same terms as the revoked one.
The common law rule for which appellant contends has never
had specific or express recognition in Utah; and its introduction
into our legal system would not be in accord with the policy of
the state as reflected in its statutes, and in the rules of property
and property rights which have already been settled by judicial
determination.
See: Roane v. Hollingshead, 25 At. 807 (Md.)
Hastin·gs v. Day, 130 N. W. 134. (Iowa)
Lee v. Blewett, 77 So. 147. (Miss)
In re Lyon's Will, 71 N. W. 362. (Wisc)
Noyes v. Southworth, 20 N. W. 891. (Mich)
In re Hillaert's Estate, 21 N. W. 2d 155 (Mich)
Ward's Will, 35 N. W. 731. (Wisc)
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In re Hunt's Will, 17 Atl. 68. (Maine)
Kelly v. Stevenson, 88 N. W. 739. (Minn)
In re Smith's Estate, 97 P. 2d 677. (Wyo)
Owen v. Younger, 242 S. W. 2d 895. (Tex)
POINT II
THE WILL OF AN UNMARRIED WOMAN IS NOT REVOKED
BY HER MARRIAGE IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
The testatrix in the instant case died without issue, and the
Court is not called upon to determine whether the words "testator"
and "wife" used in Sec. 74-1-24 Utah Code Annotated 1953, and
Sections 74-1-31 and 74-1-32 comprehend the female gender. Sec·
tion 74-1-25 supplements Sec. 74-1-1 which provides "* * * that
a married man shall not devise away from his wife more than two·
thirds in value of his legal or equitable estates in real property
without her consent in writing;" and further supplements Sec. 74-4-3
Utah Code Annotated 1953 which provides that "One-third in
value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property pos·
sessed by the husband at any time during the marriage, to which
the wife has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be set
apart as her property in fee simple, if she survives him; * * *." A
logical extension of appellant's argument as related to "Words
used in one gender comprehend the other" in the construction of
our statutes as related to husband and wife would not be in har·
mony with the long established property rights of this state as
fixed by statute and buttressed by judicial interpretation, and
would be inconsistent with the manife:;t intent of the legislature.
The Appellant cites In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P.
2d 445, and stresses the Court's statement therein "that the constitution of this state effects equality between husband and wife inso·
far as disposing of his or her separate property by will is con·
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cerned;" and that the evident aim of the constitution "was to
bring about equality, not inequality." That case makes reference
with approval to the prior case of In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah
390, 73 P. 2d 967, also relied upon by Appellant, which specifically recognizes that the equality contended for is not absolute.
The Court in the Mower case cites what is now Sec. 74-1-3 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as fol lows:
"A married woman may dispose of all her estate by
will without the consent of her husband, and may alter or
revoke her will in the same manner as if she were single.
Her will must be executed and proved in the same manner
as other wills."
And the Court then states:
"This is merely a freedom from marital control and
confers no rights different from those of her husband. The
only difference is in section 101-1-1 (now section 74-1-1 ),
which provides a married man cannot devise', away from
his wife, more than two-thirds of his real estate without
her consent in writing.***." (italics supplied.)
The contention of Appellant that "The ratio decidendi behind the common-law rule was that the appearance of a new heir
effected such a change of circumstances that a pre-existing will
would be revoked as a matter of law," is denied by the very case
of In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P. 2d 445, upon which
the Appellant heavily relies. The Court in that case, interpreting
the constitutional provision that the estate of a female "may be
conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried,"
said:

"It is evident, however, that the very wording of the
constitutional provision is such as to evidence an intent (1)

to do away with Jhe common law doctrines under which
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there was created by law an estate in the husband as an incident to marriage; and (2) so freeing it from such interest
of the husband, give to the wife the right to dispose of it.

At common law, the birth of a child gave rise to an obligation to provide for its care and support, at least during its minority, and endowed the child with a moral right under ordinary circumstances to expect recognition in the distribution of its parent's
estate. The wife was under no common law obligation to support
her husband, and the laws of Utah, Sections 74-1-1 and 74-4-6 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, have provided for each a fixed share in
the other's estate which cannot be taken away or diminished by
will or other act of his or her spouse. Subject to that right, each
may, by will fully dispose of all the rest of his or her estate to
others. See: Hastings v. Day, 130 N. W. 134.
Under the common law it was not, upon the marriage of a
woman, the appearance of a new heir that automatically revoked
her will-it was not the marriage itself, but was her testamentary
incapacity incident to her marriage which was the destroying power which worked that result, for by the common law such result
could be avoided, and testamentary capacity preserved, by an antenuptial agreement reserving to her the power to dispose of her
separate property as if sole. Therefore, when, in Utah, by constitutional and statutory provision, women were given the testamentary
capacity to devise or bequeath their estate as if they were unmarried, the common law rule was repealed, and their testamen·
tary capacity was preserved to them exactly as an antenuptial
agreement would have done at common law. If the subsequent marriage of a woman does not revoke her will where her testamentary
capacity is reserved to her by an antenuptial agreement, necessarily the same result fol lows when the constitution and statute
expressly continues such capacity subject to the statutory reserva-
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tions imposed by the legislature. See: Kelly v. Stevenson, 88 N. W.
739.
In connection with the issue with which we are confronted in
the instant case, it must be recognized that there are numerous
statutory variations controlling the subject within the various states.
It is noted, for example, that in the cases of Ellis vs. Darden·, 12 S.
E. 652, and Owens v. Haines, 199 Penn. 137, 48 Atl. 859, cited by
Appellant, the statutes provided in substance that when a person
makes a will and afterward marries or has a child not provided
for in such will, as distinguished from the Utah statute which provides "if after making a wil I the testator marries and has issue;"
and as a result of such statutory variations there are naturally
many unharmonious judicial interpretations and opinions.
POINT Ill
TESTACY RATHER THAN

INTESTACY

PREFERRED;

IM-

PLIED REVOCATIONS RESTRICTED BY STATUTE.
The statutes of Utah have codified the general rule that it
is the policy of the law to indulge every legal presumption in favor of the validity of a wil I.
Sec. 74-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides:
"A will is to be construed according to the intention of
the testator. Where his intention can not have effect to its
full extent, it must have effect as far as possible."
Sec. 74-2-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides:
"The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative."
Sec. 74-2-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides:
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"Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent a total intestacy."
The exclusive methods of revoking a will in this state are set
forth in Sec. 74-1-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as follows:
"Except in the cases in this chapter mentioned, no
written will, nor any part thereof, can be revoked or altered
otherwise than:
(I) By a written will, or other writing of the testator de.
daring such revocation or alteration executed with the
same formalities with which a will should be executed
by such testator; or,
(2) By being burned, torn, cancelled, obliterated or de·
stroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revok.
ing the same, by the testator himself or by some per·
son in his presence and by his direction."
None of the provisions in Chapter I on the Execution and Revocation of Wills, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provide that the
will of an unmarried woman is presumed to be revoked under any
circumstances. The privilege of disposing of one's property by will
is not a natural right but depends upon positive law, and may
properly be regulated and restricted by the legislature; and the
mode of its execution, the manner of its revocation, and the class
of person who may make a will, and what changes in the personal
status of such persons after its execution shall operate as a revoca·
tion or be sufficient reasons for denying probate, are all matters
within and committed to legislative competency. In re: Little's 22
Utah 204, 61 Pac. 899; In re: Mower's Estate 93 Utah 390, 73 P.
2d 967. Counsel for the appellant points out that the Utah legislature enacted into statute the common law on revocation of a
man's will. If the Utah legislature had intended to adopt the com·
mon law that the will of an unmarried woman was revoked upon

II
her marriage, the legislature would have so provided. !n the construction of Sec. 74-1-25, Utah Code Annotated 1953, no obtrusion to include a person not clearly comprehended therein can be
recognized, as such statute is in derogation of the general power
to make a will, is in the nature of an exception thereto, and must
be accorded a strict construction. In re: Comassi's Estate, 40 Pac.
15; Owen v. Younger, 242 S. W. 2d 895.
The effect of the provisions of Sec. 74-1-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is to do away with the doctrine of implied revocation except in those cases expressly and succinctly excepted by
legislative enactment.
The appellant places great reliance upon the word "testator"
as the same is used throughout Title 74, Chapters I, 2 and 3,
Wills & Succession, Utah Code Annotated 1953 -

in fact the

word "testator" is employed in excess of fifty times, and the
word "testatrix" - a female testator - does not appear once.
However, only in Sections 74-1-24 and 74-1-25 is the intended sex
of the word "testator" made explicit, and its gender expressly confined to the male as destinguished from the female, in that these
sections of the statute make express reference to the wife as the
intended survivor of the testator. As hereinbefore stated, we are
not in this case confronted with the necessity of placing an interpretation on the legislative intent as related to Section 74-1-24,
for there was no issue born of the marriage of decedent and the
appellant. As to Section 74-1-25, it supplements and relates to
Section 74-1-1 which provides "that a married man shall not devise away from his wife more than two-third in value of his legal
and equitable estates in real property without her consent in writing." To interpret Section 74-1-25 as meaning both sexes would be
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature. It has been
consistently held that where the language of a statute is plain and
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conveys definite, sensible meaning, the court must enforce it according to the obvious meaning of the words employed. Evans v.

Reiser, 78 Utah 253, 2 P. 2d 615; Riches v. Hadlock, 80 Utah 265,
15 P. 2d 283; Salt Lake Union Stock Yards v. State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 166, 71 P. 2d 538; In re Stevens' Estate, 102 Utah
255, 130 P. 2d 85.

If the will of the testatrix, executed while she was an unmarried woman, was revoked by her marriage, she could have, the day
following her marriage, made an identical will which would only
have been subject to her husband's right of homestead, unless we
are, without reservation, to accept appellant's proposed statutory
construction and say that the words "married man" in Section 741-1 comprehend the words "married woman," and there by upset a
statutory provision of over half a century standing in this state so
as to place men and woman on exactly the same footing contended for by appellant.

CONCLUSION
A determination by the court that the decedent's will, made
while she was single, was not revoked by her marriage, but that
there is reserved to her husband a homestead, will be in harmony
with In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P. 2d 445; the relative
rights of men and women, and the constitution and laws of this
state. The decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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Attorney for Respondent
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Price, Utah

